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ADOLESCENT COMPETENCY AND THE
REFUSAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT*
Martin T. Harveyt
I. INTRODUCTION
Should adolescents' be allowed to refuse medical treatment such
that death/serious disability will most likely be a consequence of their
refusal? Tradition responds with a resounding "No." Given their
minor status, adolescents have historically been lumped together with
other obvious incompetents - e.g., infants - under the legal rubric of
'presumptive decisional incapacity.' As of late, while some scholars
(hereafter the orthodox camp) continue to uphold a modified version
of the traditional doctrine, others (hereafter the radical camp) argue
for a diametrically opposed position: 'presumptive decisional
capacity' for adolescents.2 On the latter view, the presumptive
" I would like to thank my colleague Joe DeMarco for his comments and
criticisms of an earlier version of this article.
Martin Harvey, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at
Cleveland State University.By "adolescent" I mean an individual between the ages of thirteen and up
to but not including eighteen years.
2 For an orthodox view see Lainie Friedman Ross, Children, Families and
Health Care Decision-Making (1998). For radical views see Sarah Elliston, If You
Know What's Good for You: Refusal of Consent to Medical Treatment by Children,
Contemporary Issues in Law, Medicine and Ethics 29-55 (Sheila McLean, ed. 1996)
and especially see Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for
Medical Care: Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
87, 88-89 (2001) (claiming that adolescent autonomous decision making is denied
without compelling legal rationale) and Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy:
Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265 (2000). See also Joan-
Margaret Kun, Rejecting the Adage "Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard" - The
Mature Minor Doctrine 16 PACE L. REV. 423 (1996); Jennifer L. Rosato, The
Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minor's Have a Right to Make Decisions
Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1996). Each argues
for an evidentiary, case-by-case approach to evaluating adolescent competency to
refuse medical treatment. They differ, however, in how high they set the
"competency bar": Kun demands that a clear and convincing evidence standard apply
in all cases while Rosato advocates a considerably lesser standard. As such, Kun
essentially belongs in the orthodox camp while Rosato proffers a fairly radical
position. The difference thus between Kun and Rosato and the aforementioned
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competency bar for both consent/refusal of medical treatment should
be substantially lowered. Both types of presumptive doctrines share a
common procedural virtue: each provides a fairly rigorous 'bright
line' test to determine whether an adolescent's decision to refuse
recommended medical treatment ought to be respected.
Unfortunately, however, such procedural virtues, in the present case at
least, breed substantive vices. On the one hand, a doctrine of
presumptive incapacity problematically excludes, as a priori
incompetent, the request of a thoughtful and reflective terminally ill3
adolescent to forgo further clinical interventions. On the other, a
doctrine of presumptive capacity problematically includes, as a priori
competent, the decision of a less than reflective otherwise healthy
adolescent to refuse life-saving medical treatment.
In what follows, I seek to remedy these vices by arguing for a
sliding scale conception of adolescent competency pegged to the
possibility of therapeutic benefit.4 I begin by briefly outlining the
unique legal standing of adolescents. I then turn to a succinct analysis
of the legal cases and principles surrounding an adolescent right to
refuse medical treatment. Subsequently, I provide broad outlines of
the respective arguments to be made for both presumptive capacity
and presumptive incapacity of adolescent decision-making ability. At
this juncture, I introduce my sliding scale approach both as a critique
of, and improvement upon, the aforementioned presumptive doctrines.
Lastly, I consider procedural issues entailed by my account,
specifically the problem of equitable conflict resolution.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: ADOLESCENTS AND THE
LAW
Adolescents present the law with a metaphysical quandary - their
problematically crepuscular legal existence is implied in philosopher
John Locke's apt phrase that "we are born free as we are born
rational; not that we actually have the exercise [at birth] of either: age
that brings one brings with it the other too."'5  In other words,
authors is in matters of practical application as opposed to theoretical commitment.
Hence, while Hartman "applauds" Rosato's endeavors, she [Hartman] finds the
resulting Froposal "unworkable." See Hartman (2000) at note 265.
By "terminally ill" I mean the standard medical notion of less than six
months to live as confirmed by two physicians.
4 No one in the literature has yet considered a sliding scale model as a
possible solution posed by the requests of adolescents to refuse medical treatment. I
fully develop such a model in Section VI below.
5 John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 35
(Prometheus Books 1986) (1690).
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personhood is a metaphysical process involving a transformation from
becoming to being over time that at some interval, for purely practical
reasons, e.g., granting the right to vote, must be rendered a legal event
that, ceteris paribus, occurs at an arbitrarily fixed point in time (the
age of majority). Adolescents, in many times being able to give
forceful, rational articulations of their wishes and desires, are
markedly different from other legal non-persons such as infants, the
profoundly retarded, and the senile. Their quasi-personhood is well
reflected in the law, which, observes Elizabeth S. Scott, adopts a
"binary classification" scheme: occasionally adolescents count as
adults but usually they count as children.6 On the one hand,
adolescents may seek gainful employment, decide (in most states) to
quit school at age sixteen, and on occasion, be held criminally
responsible for their behavior. On the other, adolescents are
prohibited from purchasing alcohol or cigarettes, from voting and
serving on a jury, and cannot enter into binding contracts.
In the health care arena a similar 'binary classification' system
exists.7 In the vast majority of cases physicians must (on the pain of
possible battery charges) obtain parental consent before treating an
adolescent. 8 Being shy of the age of legal majority, adolescents are
assumed to lack sufficient cognitive and conative maturity to craft
autonomous health care choices, therefore being deemed legally
incapable of giving genuine informed consent to medical treatment.
The ease (and in many cases necessity) of a 'bright-line' arbitrary
cutoff for such legal practices as serving on a jury, however, is not
completely carried over to the domain of medical treatment. Legal
exceptions, for both practical and ethical reasons, obtain. From a
practical perspective, allowing adolescents an independent right to
consent to some types of medical treatment, without their parents'
6 Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction ofAdolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 548 (2000). Scott's primary concern is to preserve a separate, though
modified, category of juvenile criminal law. She touches on adolescent healthcare
issues only tangentially.
7 Several succinct overviews exist. See, e.g., A.M. Capron, The
Competence of Children as Self-Deciders in Biomedical Interventions, in WHO
SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT (Willard Gaylin & Ruth
Macklin eds., 1982) (describing the circumstances and rationale for both allowing
adolescent decision making and for not allowing it) and Walter J. Wadlington,
Consent to Medical Care for Minors: The Legal Framework, in CHILDREN'S
COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 57, 57-74 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983). See also
Hartman, supra note 2, at 1306-55 for a nice summation of differing adolescent
decision making powers.
8 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 at
117 (5th ed. 1984) (stating emergency exceptions to the consent requirement do exist).
20031
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foreknowledge, serves important public policy goals. Thus, in the
utilitarian interest of preventing suicide, curbing illicit drug and
alcohol abuse and halting the spread of venereal disease, adolescents
are allowed to consent to the treatment of mental health disorders,
alcohol/drug addiction and STDs without parental approval.
Furthermore, by and large on ethical grounds alone, abortion case law
carves out an independent realm of qualified adolescent medical
decision-making. In a string of related cases 9 the courts have
consistently ruled that if a minor seeking an abortion can both
demonstrate the ability to understand the risks and benefits of an
elective abortion procedure and provide acceptable reasons for
terminating her pregnancy then she ought to be viewed as a "mature
minor," i.e., as a "child who is capable of understanding the nature
and consequences of a particular medical intervention, and of its
primary alternatives including non-intervention."' 0  In turn, despite
their formal minor status, such pregnant adolescents are afforded a
full legal right to reproductive autonomy, substantively identical to
that of their adult pregnant peers. To reason otherwise strikes many
jurists as grossly iniquitous. More recently, a number of scholars
have argued that sufficiently mature adolescents ought to be granted a
right to consent to participate in genetic research and clinical drug
trials."'
9 See, for instance, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danjbrth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Bellotti v Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (discussing the
ability of minors to be deemed mature by courts).
10 Capron, supra note 7, at 74. Another legal avenue remains open here: the
adolescent in question could be viewed as "partially emancipated" from his parents
within the context of health care decision-making instead of a "mature minor" (as
noted above). The latter alternative is more to the point in the context of an
adolescent making an informed refusal of treatment. Emancipation normally only
occurs by commissions/omissions on the part of parents, e.g., a minor becomes
emancipated when his/her parents grant permission to serve in the armed forces. As
such, the choice to emancipate normally rests in the parents' hands, regardless of
adolescent competency. With a 'mature minor' doctrine only looks to the decision-
making capacities of the child in question, i.e., whether or not the minor possesses the
cognitive equipment to be a "self-decider." See id. at 72-74 (explaining that whether
one is deemed a "mature minor" depends on his ability to understand his decision and
its implications).
11 See, e.g., Susan E. Zinner, The Elusive Goal of Informed Consent by
Adolescents, 16 THEORETICAL MED. 323 (1995) (noting that many adolescents are
capable of consenting to participate in research); Robert F. Weir & Jay R. Horton,
Genetic Research, Adolescents, and Informed Consent, 16 THEORETICAL MED. 347
(1995) (explaining ways to ensure that adolescents who choose to participate in
genetic research are protected); Jennifer Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A
Child's View, 28 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 362 (2000) (explaining the need to give
mature minors more decision-making powers). These authors concur that such
[Vol. 13:297
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III. AN ADOLESCENT RIGHT TO REFUSE LIFE-
SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT: CASES AND
PRINCIPLES
On which side of the binary divide would (or does) an
adolescent's right to refuse medical treatment fall? No clear-cut legal
answer has been forthcoming. In what follows, I provide a brief
overview of the pertinent cases and a succinct analysis of the legal
principles governing the judicial decisions wrought therein. Several
recent court decisions including In Re E.G. (1989), In Re Long Island
Jewish Medical Center (1990) and In Re Rena (1999) govern the
relevant legal topography.
(1) In Re E.G. (Ernestine Gregory).12 In 1989 seventeen year old
E.G., of Illinois, was suffering from acute leukemia and in order to
survive the medically recommended chemotherapy treatments she
would need to have several blood transfusions. Her chances of long-
term (>5 years) survival were estimated to be 20-25%. Both E.G. and
her mother, Rosie Denton, as practicing Jehovah's Witnesses,
adamantly refused to consent to such transfusions on the grounds that
they violated the basic tenets of E.G.'s religious faith. A trial judge
found E.G. neglected and ordered transfusions. On appeal the
appellate court found E.G. to be a "mature minor" capable of refusing
blood transfusions through the exercise of her First Amendment right
to freedom of religion.' 3 To substantiate its ruling, the appellate court
relied on an extension of Illinois abortion provisions that allowed for a
mature minor to terminate her pregnancy independently of parental
consent. Nonetheless, the appellate court affirmed the neglect finding.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate finding that E.G.
was a mature minor but dismissed the neglect finding against Rosie
Denton. The court reasoned that the "paramount question" before it
was whether or not a minor could ever be afforded a right to refuse
"life-sustaining" medical treatment.' 4 Given that E.G.'s attending
physician testified that she was "competent to understand the
consequences of accepting or rejecting treatment, and he [E.G.'s
physician] was impressed with her maturity and the sincerity of her
beliefs," and further, that a psychiatrist claimed that E.G. had the
consent ought to be allowed in research/clinical trials so long as minimal risk obtains.
Their arguments for permitting such consent, however, tend to focus on the
utilitarian/policy benefits of such research rather than the ability of adolescents to
make autonomous choices.
2 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Il. 1989).
"3 Id. at 324.
14 Id. at 325.
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decisional capacity of someone who was 18-21 years old, the court
found that a right to refuse medical treatment, on the basis of such
"clear and convincing evidence," could be exercised by a mature
minor like E.G.' 5 Nonetheless, this right was not absolute; it could be
limited by the state interest to preserve life, the doctrine of parens
patriae (particularly in light of the long-term prognosis), and the
interest of relevant third parties, i.e., the minor's parents and
guardians. Crucially, the hypothetical objection of Ms. Denton
against her daughter's refusal would have "weighed heavily" against
the ascription of a right to refuse medical treatment to E.G., regardless
of her maturity.' 
6
(2) In Re Long Island Jewish Medical Center.17  In 1990,
seventeen-year-old Phillip Malcolm, of New York, was suffering from
widespread metastatic cancer and in order to survive recommended
chemotherapy treatments a series of blood transfusions were deemed
essential. Given prompt commitment to chemotherapy, the chances of
short term (up to two years) remission of Mr. Malcolm's cancer was
estimated to 75% with long term survival pegged at 25-30%. As a
practicing Jehovah's Witness, Mr. Malcolm, with parental support,
refused consent for the necessary transfusions. The Supreme Court of
New York ruled against Mr. Malcolm primarily because he failed to
show clear and convincing evidence that he was capable of making
such a mature, reflective and weighty decision, e.g. he knew little of
the Jehovah Witness faith other than the prohibition on blood
transfusions and described himself as a "child" to the court.
1 8
Nonetheless, Justice Posner recommended that the state "take a hard
look at the 'mature minor' doctrine and make it either statutory or
decisional law in New York."' 9
(3) In Re Rena.20 In 1999, seventeen-year-old Rena (not her real
name), of Massachusetts, suffered a lacerated spleen in a
snowboarding accident and required a blood transfusion to survive.
With the transfusion her long-term health prospects were excellent.
Rena, however, was a practicing Jehovah's Witness, and with her
parents support, refused to consent to a blood transfusion. A court
ordered transfusion was approved. On appeal and following In Re
E.G., the appellate court severely chastised the trial judge for refusing
to consider whether or not Rena was a mature minor. As Rena had
"5 Id. at 323-24, 327.
16 Id. at 328.
17 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
8 See id. at 241-43 (holding that the patient was not a "mature minor").
'9 Id. at 243.
20 In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155 (1999).
[Vol. 13:297
ADOLESCENT COMPETENCY
checked out of the hospital on the day following the transfusion and
was no longer in medical danger the case was vacated on mootness
grounds.
In turn, four legal principles come to bear on the decisions of the
court in the aforementioned cases:
(1)An unqualified liberty interest possessed by competent
adults to refuse any and all medical treatments even if the
consequences are fatal.2'
(2) A qualified liberty interest possessed by parents to make
medical decisions for their minor children.22
(3)A state interest, as exemplified in the doctrine of parens
patriae, in protecting incompetents from their own bad
decisions and the bad decisions of those trusted to care for
them.23
(4) A state interest in the preservation of life.24
Clearly, (1) is the most important governing principle listed
above.25 In line with Cardoza's famous dictum, it is by now judicially
well established that every person of "adult years and sound mind"
has the right to determine what happens to their own bodies.26 The
motivating ethical idea thereby captured, of course, is that adults of
21 See Bouvia v Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-01 (App. Div. 1986)
(holding that competent individuals have a right to refuse medical treatment); In re
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (holding the right of an adult to refuse life saving
treatment); and Cruzan v Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262
(1990) ("A competent person has a liberty interest ... in refusing unwanted medical
treatment"). For succinct commentary see LEANNA DARVALL, MEDICINE, LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 54-84 (1993).
22 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (discussing parents' right to
refuse compulsory formal education for their children) and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602, (1979) (discussing the family unit and the role of parents to act in the best
interests of their children).
23 See In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)
(upholding the doctrine of parens patriae in action ordering parents to get medical
treatment for their twelve year old daughter).
24 See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233 (N.J. 1985) (noting the commonly
held belief that states may act to preserve life) and Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-81
(holding that Missouri's interest in protecting and preserving human life was
legitimate).
25 Two other state interests, preventing suicide and maintaining the ethical
integrity of the medical profession, are often cited - see Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977) - but are
assigned no weight in the typical adolescent refusal of treatment case. In re E.G., 549
N.E.2d at 328.
26 Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
2003]
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sound mind are autonomous beings whose choices, including whether
or not to consent to medical treatment, ought to be respected. The
factual question, aside from having reached the age of majority (to
which I return momentarily) is whether or not a particular individual
is competent, i.e., retains adequate decisional capacity. Succinctly,
competency implies the presence of a decision-making process that
reflects the workings of an autonomous mind. Importantly, the
standard of competency to which adults are held in order to exercise a
right to refuse medical treatment is exceedingly low. So long as they
apparently understand the risks and consequences of their prospective
choice to refuse, regardless of how irrational such a choice may strike
their attending physicians, patients are protected by principle (1) from
any outside interference. Adults are thus presumed competent, i.e.,
their choices are respected so long as they do not display any overt
delusional behavior. The legal onus is on the health care team to
provide clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. For competent
adults principle (1) conclusively trumps all of the other principles
combined.
What is the relevant upshot here? Specifically, a 'mature minor'
doctrine that allows for the ascription of a right to refuse medical
treatment to a particular adolescent essentially, for all legal intents and
purposes, effects a qualified transformation of that minor individual
into a de facto adult who now falls, at least in great part, under the
rubric of principle (1). An adolescent, such as E.G. or Rena, who has
been declared a mature minor in this context deserves to have her
preferences and desires given tremendous weight, bordering on those
of a legal adult. She should not be precluded from "possessing and
exercising certain rights normally associated with adulthood." 7
Importantly, however, and unlike someone who has reached the age of
majority, an adolescent such as E.G. must meet a "clear and
convincing" evidence standard before being afforded such a change in
her legal status." The onus is thus on her to prove competency by
evidencing her capacity to provide a through understanding of the
consequences of her proposed decision to terminate treatment along
with well articulated reasons as to why her decision ought to be
respected. Following In Re Long Island Jewish Medical Center,
adolescents who fail to measure up to such a demanding standard will
be denied a right to refuse medical treatment.29 The courts have thus
primarily adopted an evidentiary approach to adolescent competency;
27 In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325.
28 Id. at 327.
29 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
[Vol. 13:297
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it constitutes the exception, not the norm. Furthermore, even if an
adolescent meets these evidentiary requirements, her right to refuse,
unlike that of a competent adult, is by no means absolute - her
decision to refuse treatment may, but need not, be trumped by
principles (2)-(4).
Principle (2) has long been recognized as being embodied in the
common law. Given their presumably deep feelings for the welfare of
their children, parents are allowed a great deal of liberty in choosing
appropriate medical care for them. This state of affairs is well
recognized in the law whereby, as noted above, medical practitioners
who fail to obtain the informed consent of parents before performing
procedures on their children can possibly be held liable for battery.
Parents are also provided with relatively wide latitude to refuse
treatment, again on the assumption that they have the best interests of
their children at heart. As such, in the cases above, parental support is
given great weight, particularly in In Re E.G., for allowing the
exercise of a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment by an
adolescent - even if said adolescent satisfied the mature minor
criterion. The tremendous weight attached to parental support should
come as no surprise in the above cases as the attempted exercise of a
right to refuse was being made on religious grounds, another area
traditionally under parental purview. To allow the easy exercise of
such a right on such grounds, absent parental input and support, was
deemed too potentially harmful to legitimate third party, i.e. parental,
interests.
Principle (2) itself, as well as the mature minor qualified version
of principle (1), may be limited by principle (3), the traditional parens
patriae interest that the state has in protecting incompetents,
particularly minor children, from irrational and dangerous decisions
whether attempted to be made on their behalf by their
parents/guardians or by themselves. As Justice Posner observes in In
Re Long Island Jewish Medical Center, "parents may throw their own
lives away if they wish, but they cannot make martyrs of their
children." 30 Presumably then, as in the case of Philip Malcolm, if an
adolescent is incapable of understanding the tenets of his or her
religious faith, then regardless of his or her parents' support, he or she
cannot be allowed to refused treatment on such grounds. Also, as
Justice Ryan, writing for the majority in E.G., notes "where the health
care issues are potentially life threatening, the State parens patriae




consequential."'" Thus, the state apparently has a duty to weigh well
any attempted exercise of a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment by
a minor - mature or otherwise. One would also expect this state
interest to be weighted even heavier if the procedure in question
would restore the adolescent to (near) complete health. As such,
principle (3) depending upon the circumstances, can trump principles
(1) and (2) either taken singly or combined. Lastly, and normally
cited either prior to, or on the heels of, principle (3) is principle (4),
the state interest in the preservation of life. Clearly, our judicial
tradition has always recognized this principle as being of the 'core'
variety. Prima facie, the state views the life of any citizen, unless
conclusive evidence is presented to the contrary, such as a competent
adult exercising a right to refuse medical treatment, as worthy of
preservation and protection. Hence, principle (4) is particularly
relevant in cases when "a minor's life and health are at stake . . .
[particularly if said] minor may have a long and fruitful life ahead., 32
Principle (4), normally but not necessarily in combination with
principle (3), can also be weighted heavily enough to override both
principles (1), at least in the case of mature minors, and (2).
The current legal landscape could thus be summarized as follows:
In jurisdictions where mature minor doctrines are recognized,
adolescents who produce clear and convincing evidence satisfying the
criteria thereof have been afforded a qualified liberty interest (unlike
competent adults whose liberty interest thereunto is unqualified) to
forgo further life-sustaining treatment. Their right to forgo such
treatment, however, has been tempered both by the third party interest
of their parents to choose the medical care they believe most
appropriate for their minor children and the state's interest in the
preservation of life. Furthermore, the courts have ruled that both the
liberty interests of the minor's themselves and their parents may be
trumped by the state doctrine of parens patriae. Nonetheless, the
principles discussed above have been applied to a very idiosyncratic
set of cases: each involved an adolescent Jehovah's Witness who
wished to refuse treatment for religious reasons. What about the
refusal of treatment by a minor in the case of terminal/chronic illness
simply on the grounds that they wish to forgo further suffering?
Consider the 1994 cases of Benny Agrelo and Billy Best. Benny
Agrelo33 was a fifteen-year old living in Florida who had undergone
"' In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327.
32 Id.
33 See Christine Gorman, A Sick Boy Says "Enough!", TIME, June 27, 1994,
at 65 (noting how adverse side effects led Benny to give up treatment).
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two liver transplants. Due to severely debilitating side effects
experienced while taking the immunosupressant drug cyclosporin,
Benny decided to stop taking his medication thereby potentially
inducing liver failure. He was briefly forced to resume his
immunosupressant regimen by the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative services. A Broward County juvenile court judge
decided, after lengthy separate meetings with Benny, his mother (who
was initially opposed to her son's refusal), and Benny's health care
team, that Benny was mature enough to understand what he was
doing. The judge subsequently permitted Benny to make his own
decision and prohibited further interference from either the state of
Benny's physicians. After a few months without immunosupressants,
Benny died of liver failure. Unfortunately, since juvenile court
records are sealed, we cannot learn the judge's precise reasoning but
presumably he decided the case along similar jurisprudential lines as
E.G., i.e., Benny understood the consequences of his decision, was
suffering from a severe chronic illness and had the eventual support of
his mother.
Billy Best presents perhaps an even more provocative case. 34 As
a sixteen-year old living in Massachusetts, Billy was diagnosed with
Hodgkin's disease. With a full course of chemotherapy treatments
Billy's physicians predicted a 90% chance of a cure. Two months
into his six-month chemotherapy regimen Billy rebelled against
further treatment, claiming that the medications were "killing him."
35
Fearing that further chemotherapy sessions would be forced, Billy ran
away from home. After subsequent promises from his parents not to
force treatment Billy returned to New England (where he continues to
live) and began alternative therapies. The state chose not to intervene.
Should Billy's decision have been allowed to stand? Clearly, given
the high chance of a cure, it would seem that the state could have
exercised its interests both in the preservation of life and on the
grounds of parens patriae. Was Billy really competent to make such
a decision, even with the agreement of his parents? Scholars are
deeply divided on this issue. On the one hand, what might be termed
the 'radical' camp argues for presumptive decisional capacity for
adolescents. As such, the autonomy bar for medical decision-making
would be substantively lowered to include almost all adolescents. On
the other, the 'orthodox' camp, as it were, views such a move with
deep suspicion and either claims that competency alone is insufficient
34 Weary of Chemotherapy, Teen-Ager With Cancer Runs Away, N.Y. TIMES,




to grant such a powerful liberty interest, or that the notion of a 'mature
minor' itself is substantively bankrupt. Adolescents thus should not
be afforded an independent autonomy right to refuse medical
treatment. In the next section I briefly summarize and critique each
position.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR RADICAL AND ORTHODOX
CONCEPTIONS OF ADOLESCENT AUTONOMY
The radical conception of adolescent autonomy has a great deal of
primafacie ethical force: only competence matters. As Sarah Elliston
vociferously contends "there is something inherently unjust about the
concept of adults, who function at similar reasoning levels as
adolescents, possessing additional rights merely as a function of
chronological age."36 Such 'treat equals equally' sentiments certainly
have some merit seeing as they are deeply woven into the historical
fabric of Anglo-American jurisprudence. After all, as several scholars
have pointed out, it appears hypocritical at best to allow a juvenile to
be tried as an adult, and indeed even be sentenced to death, yet at the
same time, to prohibit this very same juvenile from having any
genuine input into the course of their medical treatment. 37 Similar to
Elliston, Rhonda Gay Hartman has argued in two recent articles that,
as part of a broader program to carve out a separate constitutional
realm for adolescents, the traditional doctrine of presumptive
decisional incapacity is an affront to the "dignity" of the vast majority
of adolescents who are quite capable of deciding for themselves
whether or not to under go a recommended medical intervention.
She contends that the ethically suspect and practically inconsistent
notion of presumed decisional incapacity must be replaced by the
concept of "autonomous decisional ability" on the part of
adolescents. 39 On her view (as well as Elliston's), unless they prove
otherwise by their overt behavior, adolescents, simply as a class,
ought to be presumed competent to refuse medical treatment. In turn,
the clear and convincing evidence standard and evidentiary approach
to adolescent competency as set down in E.G. is simply too restrictive.
Instead, the following regulative ideal should obtain: adolescents
should simply be viewed as on par, autonomy-wise, with their
36 Elliston, supra note 2, at 329-30.
37 See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 2, at 1267, 1287 (noting the incongruity of
treatment of adolescents).
38 See id. at 1321 (describing a situation where treatment prolongs suffering
with a low therapeutic value).
39 Id. at 1270-71. See also Hartman (2001), supra note 2, at 87-88.
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chronologically advanced peers. The onus should thus be on
physicians to prove incompetency as opposed to burdening
adolescents, as is now the case in even the most liberal of
jurisdictions, with proving that they are competent. To add empirical
meat to their radical proposal, these scholars reference numerous
social psychological studies, the most famous of which was conducted
by Weithom and Cambell (1982), which provide evidence of the
comparable decision-making capacities of adults and adolescents with
regard to consenting/refusing to medical treatment.40 In sum, on this
view Billy Best, Rena, Benny Agrelo, E.G., and potentially even
Philip Malcolm (who did understand that refusing transfusions would
hasten his death) would be presumed competent and should be
afforded an autonomy right to refuse further medical interventions.
In arguing that 'competency is competency regardless of age' the
position crafted by proponents of the radical view is both provocative
and powerful. Nonetheless, when pushed, I believe that a fatal
weakness becomes exposed, Consider the following hypothetical:
Upon visiting a cardiologist after suffering from a severely
irregular heart beat, a seventeen-year-old high school football
player is informed that he needs surgery to correct a
potentially fatal heart valve defect. Once performed, he will
be able to resume most daily activities and should live out his
normal lifespan. Unfortunately, however, as a complication
of surgery he will no longer be able to play football. The teen
claims that football is the most important thing in his life and
that he would rather die than give up the game he loves. He
adamantly opposes surgery, while readily admitting that he
understands that the consequences of his decision would most
likely prove fatal. 4
40 L.A. Weithom & S.B. Cambell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1589-
98 (1982). They found that fourteen-year-olds, on average, were just as competent to
understand the risks and benefits of various hypothetical treatment interventions, as
well as able to provide an acceptable reason for their choice, as the eighteen- and
twenty-one-year-old 'adult' control groups. In turn, nine-year-olds tested at a
significant 'competency- disadvantage'. The results of their study, however, must be
taken with a grain of salt: all participants were healthy and all participants were from
white, well educated, upper-middle class, North American families. Given the
demographic narrowness of the representative sample it would seem hazardous, from
a policy implementation perspective, to generalize the study into supporting the
notion of presumptive competency for all adolescents' fourteen-years of age and up.
41 This case is a version of an example employed by James F. Drane, The
Many Faces of Competency. 15(2) THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, April 1985, at 17,
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Should this adolescent's decision be allowed to stand - even with
parental support? Most physicians, lawyers and adolescent
psychologists would be appalled if it were. Indeed, both the state's
interest in the preservation of life and the doctrine of parens patriae
could, in the present legal climate, be readily invoked to override the
youth's decision - with or without parental support. And presumably
with good reason. Nonetheless, on the radical view summarized
above, it is hard to see why the teen's decision to refuse treatment
should not be respected. After all, he is not delusional, e.g., he does
not believe that his heart valve defect will miraculously disappear, and
furthermore, he is making a choice consistent with what he values
most in life, football. If he were eighteen clearly his choice would
have to be respected. Most of us would find such a choice as
decidedly irrational and tragic, i.e., 'a waste of a life', but nonetheless
in a liberal society such as ours who is to say that one's dominant
conception of the good life cannot be active participation in football.
Hartman (who unfortunately does not consider such hard cases)
claims that parens patriae remains "foundational" but goes on to
argue that the concept needs to be revolutionized in the case of
adolescents as a vehicle for the promotion of "self-determination" as
opposed its traditional role of preventing adolescents from making an
irrational refusal.42 As such it would seem that from a legal and
public policy perspective, the radical view, in this very important
instance, leaves much to be desired.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the orthodox view avoids
such concerns but as I argue below it falls victim to an equally
problematic objection. Proponents of the orthodox view normally
adopt one of two strategies: either they cast serious dispersions on the
decisional capacities of adolescents or they grant that adolescents are
competent but that parental support functions as a necessary condition
for any adolescent refusal of treatment. Either way, the resulting
conception of adolescent competency is severely constrained. With
regards to the first strategy, many scholars argue that the radical
camp's reliance on a presumptive decisional capacity standard for
adolescents is empirically flawed. 3  Substantive differences
20-21. 42 Hartman, supra note 2, at 1357-59.
43 See, e.g., Ann Driggs, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have
the Right to Die? II HEALTH-MATRIX 687, 702-08 (2001) (discussing decision-
making capabilities of adolescents); Jessica A. Penkower, The Potential Right of
Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment - Fatal Misuse
of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1194-1208 (1996)
(discussing the difficulty in determining maturity of the chronically ill adolescent as it
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purportedly exist between the respective healthcare decisional
capacities of adolescents and adults. Specifically, as noted by Ann
Driggs, adolescents, unlike adults, tend to be much more likely to
make decisions based upon a desire for peer acceptance, many times
discount long term costs in favor of short term benefits, and display,
on average, a much greater willingness to make risky choices. 4
"Age-relative values" thus potentially cloud the adolescent's ability to
render a rational decision in line with their long-term best interests.45
Such tendencies are further exacerbated by what Jennifer Penkower
refers to as the "uniqueness of the chronically ill adolescent., 46 To
wit, chronically ill adolescents, e.g., teen age renal transplant
recipients, usually experience severe isolation and loneliness due to
their difficulty of forming lasting peer relationships, frustration at the
thought of a potentially bleak future, excessive dependence upon their
parents (particularly when their peers are becoming increasingly
independent) and typically exhibit dangerously low levels of
compliance to life sustaining treatment regimens. As such,
chronically ill adolescents are much more likely to suffer from severe
depression thereby leaving it open to serious doubt as to whether a
request for the refusal of further treatment is prompted by serious and
thoughtful reflection or underlying mental illness. Such behavior on
the part of chronically ill adolescents "markedly exceeds that of
similarly ill adults., 47 Based upon such dour empirical assessments,
presumptive decisional incapacity to refuse treatment constitutes the
most prudent default position.
relates to the mature minor doctrine).
44 Driggs, supra note 43, at 704 (citing Elizabeth Scott, Judgment and
Reasoning in Adolescent Decision-making, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1643-46 (1992))
4 Rosalind Ekman Ladd & Edwin N. Forman, Adolescent Decision-Making:
Giving Weight to Age-Specific Values, 16 THEORETICAL MED. 333, 336-37 (1995).
Ladd and Forman distinguish between "age-specific values" and, by implication,
"age-independent values": the former tend to change as one matures while the latter,
once obtained, remain constant. For adolescents, age-specific values include such
things as high emphases on "body image" and "acceptance by peer group." Clearly,
these values can seriously impede one's capacity to make a competent decision, e.g.,
refusing chemotherapy for a cancer with a high cure rate simply due to fear of
temporary hair loss. The authors, in the context of consent to participate in genetic
research, argue that, at times, adults should allow adolescents to decide on the basis of
such values. Their article does not address (nor was it meant to) the issue of an
adolescent right to refuse life-prolonging treatment in the case of terminal illness.
They borrow their version of the distinction from Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues
(1983).
46 Penkower, supra note 43, at 1194.
41 Id. at 1208.
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Another tack pursued by members of the orthodox camp, as put
forth by Lainie Friedman Ross, is to recognize that some adolescents
are competent to make such choices but their competency at best
counts as a necessary, and never a sufficient, condition for the refusal
of medical treatment.4a Ross places great weight on principle (2)
above; namely that parents have a fundamental right to make medical
decisions for their children.49 This right, in turn, should only be
trumped on the strictest grounds of state sanctioned parens patriae.
Succinctly, for Ross, an adolescent, regardless of competence, ought
never be afforded an independent right to refuse medical treatment.
She bases her claim on two arguments: first, citing empirical evidence
in line with her orthodox bedfellows, Ross contends that parents ought
to have the right to restrict the competent minor's short term freedom
to refuse medical interventions in favor of promoting his or her
"lifetime autonomy." 50 That is, as the custodians of their children's
potential to enjoy a freedom-filled future life parents may, at their
discretion, decide that medical treatment for a recalcitrant competent
child is necessary even if it contravenes the latter's wishes. Second,
Ross further argues that families qua families are ethically integrated
decisional units that exhibit a species of autonomy in their own
right.5' Succinctly, the interests of the family do not necessarily
reduce to the interests of the individual members. Therefore, as
guardians of the family's autonomy as well, parents may trump a
competent child's wish to refuse medical treatment on the grounds
that it threatens the integrity of the family unit. To sum up, on either
of the orthodox views (which tend to be mutually re-enforcing) none
of the adolescents mentioned in the above cases would have been
afforded an independent right to refuse medical treatment - at best,
and following particularly Ross, this right resides with their parents.
Legal interest should thus focus on principles (2), (3) and (4) when
approaching cases involving an adolescent request to refuse medical
treatment. Attempts to promote presumptive adolescent capacity
through the extension of principle (1) to cover most cases of
adolescent refusals of treatment should be resisted for both empirical
and ethical reasons (as noted).
Consider, however, the diametrically opposed instantiation of the
erstwhile adolescent football worshiper discussed above:
48 Ross, supra note 2, at 56-74.
49 Id. at 135-37.
50 Id. at 61.
"' Id, at 62.
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A sixteen year old is suffering from terminal leukemia. His
disease has progressed to the point where he is no longer a
suitable candidate for bone marrow transplantation. A
combination of chemotherapy and radiation treatment was
temporarily successful but recently the cancer has
metastasized to several major organs. Additional radiation
treatments may prolong the teen's life for up to three months.
The teen himself declares that he has suffered enough and
wants all treatment to stop. His anguished parents disagree
and demand that 'everything be done.'
To force treatment under such circumstances strikes most people
completely unreasonable. So long as the adolescent understands the
consequences of his decision and can provide a minimally rational
reason for so choosing (e.g., 'I've suffered enough') why not afford
him an identical legal status to a similarly situated terminally ill adult?
In such cases, the state interests in the preservation of life and even
parens patriae wane considerably. Regardless of age, the decision to
forego life prolonging treatment by a terminally ill, suffering
individual ought to be viewed as prima facie rational and the
individual crafting such a choice as ought to be viewed prima facie
competent. Such decisions, if made by those in their legal majority,
would not be construed as peer pressured, short sighted or overly
risky. What about them being made by an adolescent entails the
contrary? Concerns over the promotion of future 'life autonomy'
appear decidedly to miss the point. Indeed, the refusal of life
prolonging medical interventions may be the only chance that the
terminally ill teen ever has to exercise the type of 'life-autonomous'
choice that most of us so unreflectively take for granted.
Unfortunately, the orthodox camp tends to gloss over such cases
(Ross for instance never considers such a possibility) much to its
detriment. 52 Given these inadequacies of both the radical and the
orthodox camps in the next section I explore a middle path that
hopefully avoids the vices, but retains the virtues, of each.
V. A SLIDING SCALE APPROACH
What is the best method for determining adolescent competency
to refuse medical treatment? Following James Drane's influential
article, I want to argue for a modified version of the "sliding-scale"




conception of competency.53 As noted at the outset, conceiving of
competency in a sliding scale fashion assesses the possession thereof
as a matter of requisite degree proportionate to the possibility of
therapeutic benefit. Drane rejects the traditional "all or nothing
approach" to competency as either too exclusive, i.e., too many people
are prevented from exercising their right to medical self-determination
or too inclusive, i.e., too many people are permitted to make
egregiously unsound medical decisions. 4 A sliding scale perchance
avoids these errors by, on the one hand, setting an extremely low
threshold of competence to refuse medical treatment where little
prospect for therapeutic benefit obtains, while on the other, ratcheting
up the degree of competency required to refuse medical treatment as
expected therapeutic benefit increases accordingly. Importantly,
outcome, i.e., expected therapeutic benefit, here functions as a limiting
condition on a right to treatment refusal as opposed to the ground
thereof. In other words, failure to take probable outcome into
account, particularly when the stakes are extremely high, e.g., when
refusing a potentially life-saving intervention, indicates a serious flaw
in an individual's medical decision-making process. In turn, the
evidentiary requirements so created range from the mere ability to
engage in evincing a choice to the much more complex decisional
capacity of displaying sustained critical reflection by providing
recognizably sound reasons for treatment refusal. In the case of legal
adults, if adopted, Drane's proposal would effect a tremendous
normative transformation of the relevant legal topography by, on one
end of the spectrum, raising the competency bar to a much higher
level than it is today. For instance, a Jehovah's Witness, on Drane's
scheme, might well be prohibited from refusing a life-sustaining blood
transfusion unless he or she could articulate, in considerable detail, the
credos of his or her faith. Given the haunting specter of increased
paternalism many scholars have rejected Drane's proposal out of
hand. "
Strictly limited to adolescents, however, Drane's approach
appears to resolve the ethical conundrum sketched above: it sets very
53 Drane, supra note 41, at 18-20. Rosato, supra note 2, at 61-65 for
instance, relies on a static conception in proffering her account. See also Driggs,
supra note 43, at 715-17, aptly articulating her concluding worries about granting
adolescents a right to die, unfortunately does not consider a sliding scale approach.
54 id..
55 See Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
345, 378, 388, 396 (1996) (discussing the need to examine policy implications before
creating a standardized determination of competency).
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low standards for refusing medical treatment in the case of terminal
illness but prohibits such refusals as the potential for therapeutic
benefit increases accordingly. A priori presumptive schemes give
way to an a posteriori assessment of each individual's unique medical
circumstances. Adopting a sliding scale approach to adolescent
competency thus gels nicely with the desire to proceed on a case-by-
case basis. In doing so, I believe that the employment of a sliding-
scale escapes the pitfall of over-inclusiveness that plagues the radical
alternative while simultaneously eluding the trap of over-
exclusiveness entailed by the orthodox view. Specifically, a sliding
scale would prevent an adolescent from 'throwing' his or her life
away if the prospect of a cure were great, while it would not force a
terminally ill adolescent to undergo further treatment that simply
prolongs life in the short term with no prospect of therapeutic benefit.
It thus squares quite well with our gut level intuitions as to when
paternalistic interventions are justified in the case of adolescents and
when they are not. Succinctly, a sliding scale approach to
competency pegs the degree of competency expected of someone to
refuse medical treatment to reflect the degree of risk involved in
making that decision, i.e., the riskier the decision, the higher the
standard of competency required. Adolescent patients held to the
highest standard, i.e., attempting to refuse treatment where the
prospect of therapeutic benefit is tremendous, would in effect be
barred from forgoing such interventions. Following E.G., refusals in
cases of moderate therapeutic benefit would require the adolescent to
possess an intimate understanding of the life threatening consequences
of refusing medical treatment and that he or she be able to provide
clearly articulated reasons consistent with stated values as to why their
decision to refuse treatment ought to be respected. Lastly, adolescent
patients held to the lower standard would simply have to be aware that
they were terminally ill and exhibit sufficient capacity to refuse
further interventions by appeal to minimally acceptable reasons, e.g.,
'I've suffered enough.'
The following table provides a general schema of the practical
implications of adopting the sliding scale approach. I subsequently
expand upon successive pairs of bold face categories in turn.
Table 1: A Sliding Scale Approach to Assessing Adolescent
Competency to Refuse Medical Treatment
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THERAPEUTIC HIGH MODERATE 56  LOW
BENEFIT:
NATURE OF LIFE-SAVING LIFE- LIFE-
NTERVENTION: SUSTAINING PROLONGING
ACCEPTABLE NONE MAXIMALLY MINIMALLY
REASONS FOR RATIONAL RATIONAL
REFUSAL:
CATEGORY OF PRESUMPTIVE EVIDENTIARY PRESUMPTIVE
DECISIONAL INCAPACITY CAPACITY
CAPACITY:






CASE BILLY BENNY ILL LEUKEMIA
CLASSIFICATION: BEST, AGRELO, PATIENT
FOOTBALL PHILIP
PLAYER MALCOLM
A. Therapeutic Benefit and the Nature of Intervention: 'High'
therapeutic benefit means that both the patient's short- and long-term
prognoses are excellent. A near full recovery from whatever malady
afflicts them is expected and they should, other things being equal,
live out their normal life span unaffected by their present medical
problem. Such interventions ought to be characterized as 'Life-
Saving.' 'Moderate' therapeutic benefit means that the long-term
prognosis is decidedly problematic but that in the short term an
intervention may well provide the patient with a few additional years
of life. Nonetheless, the patient can expect little improvement in
overall quality of life for any substantial length of time as well as a
negative impact on 'normal' adolescent life activities such as
participation in sports or attending school on a regular basis. Over the
long term, death will most likely result from their present medical
condition. Such interventions ought to be characterized as 'Life-
Sustaining.' 'Low' therapeutic benefit means that both the patient's
short- and long-term prognoses are extremely poor. The patient will
most likely die in a matter of months, there being no therapeutic
56 By 'moderate therapeutic benefit' I mean that a medical intervention is
likely to produce a short term (2-3 years) life extension but the long term (>5 years)
outlook remains quite bleak
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ammunition left in the medical arsenal. Such interventions ought to
be characterized as 'Life-Prolonging'.
B. Acceptable Reasons for Refusal and the Category of
Decisional Capacity: On the one hand, in the case of 'Life-Saving'
medical interventions no acceptable reasons proffered by an
adolescent to refuse medical treatment pass muster: empirical studies
cited by proponents of the orthodox camp should here give great
pause. In these instances, 'presumptive decisional incapacity' ought
to be the norm. On the other, reasons for refusal of treatment by
terminally ill adolescents ought to be at most 'minimally rational.' If
these individuals understand that their condition is terminal, i.e., that
further interventions will be devoid of therapeutic benefit, and if they
refuse further medical interventions on universally acceptable
grounds, i.e., the desire to avoid future suffering, etc., then the
adolescent's choice should be respected. In these situations,
'presumptive decisional capacity' should be the norm. Where
therapeutic benefit is moderate, as defined, the adolescent seeking to
refuse further treatment ought to be held to a very high standard of
competency, i.e., he or she must provide clear and convincing
evidence of their competency to refuse. Reasons for refusal must be
reflective, clearly articulated, and consistent with a well-developed set
of values concerning what makes life worth living and why continued
medical treatment would sabotage such worth - i.e., such reasons
must be 'maximally rational.' For instance, among other things, an
adolescent Jehovah's Witness falling into this category would have to
demonstrate a thorough knowledge of her faith before being allowed
to refuse a life sustaining blood transfusion. Here an 'evidentiary'
case by case approach needs to be adopted with regards to decisional
capacity to insure that sufficient capacity obtains to make such
weighty decisions. Even though the long-term prognosis may be
bleak, as in the case of chronic renal disease, the possibility of several
years of additional life merits a much deeper plumbing of the
adolescent's reasons to refuse than in cases where the prospect of
therapeutic benefit is low.
C. Parental Support: Clearly, most parents have an integral, and
legally recognized, interest in the medical welfare and future well
being of their children. As such they retain a great deal of decision-
making authority thereunto. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the
state, on the grounds of parens patriae may usurp this decision-
making authority if the parents appear intent upon making a poor
medical choice for their children. Hence, even if parents would
support their minor child's decision to refuse life-saving medical
treatment such support is tout court insufficient. In the case of 'life-
sustaining' medical treatment, however, the situation changes:
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parental support is necessary for any adolescent right to refuse
treatment. Here Ross's concerns about the family as an ethically
integrated unit and the state's duty to protect legitimate third party
interests come to the fore. To permit children to refuse life saving or
even life-sustaining treatment contrary to their parents' wishes, for
example, on religious grounds, would irreparably harm the legitimate
third party interest that parents have in the potential medical decisions
crafted by their minor children. In the case of 'terminal illness',
however, given that the prospect of therapeutic benefit is nil, it is hard
to imagine what legitimate third party interest would be served by
forcing treatment. In such instances, parental support for the
adolescents' right should be unnecessary so long as the adolescent in
question exhibits the minimal degree of competency discussed above.
D. Right to Refuse: Given that there are no acceptable reasons to
refuse life saving treatment on the part of adolescents, regardless of
apparent capacity or parental support, no right is afforded them to do
so. Adolescents who wish to refuse life-sustaining treatment,
however, may be extended a 'weak' right in this regard; i.e., the
permissibility of their refusal is contingent upon clear and convincing
proof of competency and parental support. Lastly, terminally ill
adolescents, so long as they satisfy minimal conditions of competency
ought to be afforded a 'strong' right to refuse further medical
treatment, independent of parental support.
E. Case Classification. High Therapeutic Benefit: As noted, in
instances where high therapeutic benefit is at stake, adolescents are
simply prohibited from refusing treatment. In this instance, any
liberty interest that the youth in question might have is trumped both
by the legitimate third party interests of their parents to decide
appropriate medical treatment for their minor children and state
interests in the preservation of life, and if necessary, parens patriae.
Hence, the adolescent football player who would rather perish than
give up the game he loves would not be permitted to forgo the
necessary valve replacement surgery. Likewise, both Billy Best and
Rena would be overruled - regardless of parental support and the
maturity of their attendant decisional capacities. Why? In Mr. Best's
case, Hodgkin's lymphoma is an eminently treatable form of cancer
with a cure rate, so long as aggressive therapy is immediately
instituted, in excess of 80%. Although he may believe that he is
currently alive in spite of his two (out of a recommended six) months
of chemotherapy, it is much more likely that he is alive because of the
aggressive treatment of his oncology team. What if Mr. Best had
refused all treatment to begin with? Should his decision still be
allowed to stand? Clearly, there is no principled way to demarcate
between the refusal to initiate highly successful treatment (except for
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the rather lame plea: 'Try it and see if you like it') and the refusal to
continue with such treatment only one-third of the way through its
recommended course. To sanction Mr. Best's refusal of treatment
creates a slope so slippery that no state or third party interest could
possibly be invoked to trump an adolescent decision to refuse any
treatment - regardless of therapeutic benefit. Rena presents a similar
situation: clearly a lacerated spleen is life threatening but with surgery
and sufficient blood transfusions a complete recovery is (and proved
to be) possible. Regardless of parental support, and contra the
appellate court's commentary, Rena's maturity and commitment to
her religious faith in such a situation ought to be beside the point.
Why the a priori bar to an adolescent right to refuse a 'life-
saving' medical intervention? Many adolescents might well satisfy
the competency criterion established for similarly situated adults.
Pace Elliston, why prohibit their treatment refusals? Here we would
agree with Ross: it is essential for both parents and society to protect
the future lifetime autonomy of adolescents. 57  The minimal
competency standard adopted in the case of adult refusals of
lifesaving medical treatment simply reflects the priority we assign to
liberty in our society. Adults may drink excessively, chain-smoke,
ride motorcycles (in some states without helmets), and engage in a
host of other extremely risky behaviors, not because there is a
difference in kind per se between the decisional capacities of adults
and adolescents, but rather due to the priority of value placed upon
individual liberty in our society. To permit adults to make such
irrational and foolish decisions is a necessary cost of our Millian
commitment to broad individual freedom concerning personal
behavior and lifestyle choice. Such a state of affairs, however, does
not entail that we cannot provide future "emergent" persons of our
society with a protective cocoon in which to shelter them from the bad
and foolish decisions that they might otherwise make.58 Furthermore,
given that the empirical evidence cited by proponents of the orthodox
camp casts at least some doubt on the capacity of adolescents to craft
health care decisions unsullied by peer pressure and myopic
perceptions of risk, it would seem particularly prudent in cases of high
therapeutic benefit treatment refusal to error on the side of caution.
Moderate Therapeutic Benefit: To paraphrase the majority
decision in In Re E.G., the state's parens patriae interests fades both
with increasing maturity and diminished possibility of therapeutic
57 Ross, supra note 2, at 61.
58 Id. at 61. See also Capron, supra note 7, at 89 (stating that society has an
interest in protecting those who do not have the ability to protect themselves).
2003]
HEALTH MATRIX
benefit. On a sliding scale approach E.G., Philip Malcolm and Benny
Agrelo all fall into this category and ought, so long as they pass
muster, to be afforded a weak right to refuse further treatment. None
are by definition terminally ill as each retains better than even chances
of living several more years should treatment be initiated/continued.
The state therefore has the right to demand clear and convincing
evidence that the minor involved be sufficiently mature, i.e., exhibit
the requisite degree of capacity, to refuse further treatment - the state
interest in the preservation of life, though correspondingly weak, still
brings sufficient residual force to bear. Unlike adults, the court may,
and ought, to 'quiz' the minor individual to insure that the stated
reasons for refusal are clear, consistent and reflective of a deeper set
of values. The burden of proof rests on the minor in question. E.G.
and Benny Agrelo measured up to such a rigorous standard while
Philip Malcolm did not - hence the former, in conjunction with
parental support, would be allowed by the sliding-scale, should they
so desire, to refuse further life sustaining treatment.
Low Therapeutic Benefit: On the sliding scale model, in the
case of terminal illness the state's parens patriae interests diminish to
near non-existence, as does the state interest in the preservation of
life. Third party interests in continued non-therapeutic treatment also
border on being completely de-legitimized. In the scenario of the
terminally ill adolescent leukemia patient the burden of proof now
shifts to the health care team if the youth's competency is to be called
into question. Why extend essentially a priori presumptive decisional
capacities to terminally ill adolescents? Here we agree with
Hartman.59 Indeed, to force treatment in such situations inevitably
begs the question that simply 'being alive', as opposed to 'having a
life' in the deepest narrative sense, is a worthwhile state of affairs in
its own right. This is particularly so if the life to be lived amounts to
little more than a few additional pain-stricken weeks or months of
bedridden existence. Little if any reason readily presents itself to hold
such egregiously ill adolescents to a demanding standard of
competency. Presumably, in such circumstances, they are well and
truly the best judges of their own good. Given the tragic nature of the
illness and the likelihood that death is relatively imminent, the state
interest in the preservation of life would seemingly not apply and the
exercise of parens patriae is only warranted if the patient were
completely delusional. What of parents' third-party interest to
consent/refuse medical treatment for their minor children? Given the
59 Hartman, supra note 2, at 1321. See also Rosato, supra note 2, at 72-74
(discussing the state interest in preserving life).
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adolescent's dire medical circumstances and that further therapeutic
intervention will be devoid of benefit, the adolescent's liberty interest
in refusing treatment ought to be allowed to outweigh all other
interests that would force treatment to continue - even those of his or
her parents. Hence, in these cases adolescents ought to be afforded a
strong right to refuse medical treatment, a right no different in
substance from that of similarly situated terminally ill adults; potential
problems posed by peer pressure and shortsightedness would appear
to lose much of their negative force.
F. Empirical Studies. On a final brief note, a sliding scale model
also gels nicely with the well-conducted empirical studies presented
by both the radical and the orthodox camps. On the one hand,
Driggs's and others' research concerning the corrosive effects of peer
pressure, shortsightedness, and heightened willingness to render risky,
i.e., foolish, healthcare choices support the prohibition on adolescent
treatment refusal in the case of life-saving medical interventions. On
the other, the empirical work cited by Hartman and Elliston would
certainly appear to provide an experiential basis for the ascription of a
strong right of treatment refusal to terminally ill adolescents. Lastly,
given that neither set of studies carry enough empirical weight to shift
the balance decidedly in favor of one camp at the expense of another,
an evidentiary, case-by-case approach appears to be well warranted in
cases such as Benny Agrelo or Philip Malcolm.
VI. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: PRACTICAL
APPLICABILITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
So proffered, the sliding scale model provides a great deal of
policy guidance: it affords a primafacie 'bright line' test at either end
of the therapeutic spectrum but also recognizes that when the stakes
are neither high nor low an evidentiary approach emerges as the most
appropriate policy option to balance the more equally weighted legal
and ethical interests. In opposition to its thoroughly bright-line
brethren, hopefully a sliding scale approach, to steal a phrase from
H.L.A. Hart, successfully resists imposing "uniformity at the price of
distortion." Nonetheless, given the number of parties and interests
involved, conflicts are sure to arise. For a sliding scale conception to
be practically applicable proper procedures must be imposed to
resolve such conflicts with minimal harm to the interests of all
affected individuals.
The easiest sorts of potential conflicts to dispense with involve the
attempt by an adolescent to refuse life-saving treatment - with or
without parental support. As noted, all such requests should be
overridden since the minor in question is so bereft of a liberty interest
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in this context that the situation borders on there being no conflict of
interests at all. Attempts to refuse life-sustaining treatment present
slightly more complicated procedural difficulties. Here, a conflict is
likely to arise between the parents and minor child on one side and the
health care team on the other. By and large, when dealing with such
scenarios the current status quo should be retained. Normally, in the
present legal milieu, such cases result in the health care team seeking
a court order authorizing continued treatment and the parents and
adolescent petitioning that no such order be granted. In an emergency
situation, the default policy should be to continue treatment. Once the
patient's medical condition has stabilized a full psychiatric work-up
would be in order as well as meetings of the health care team and the
parents, and hopefully the adolescent, with a trial court judge in order
for the court to determine whether or not the clear and convincing
evidence burden has been met. Such a process is most likely to be
quite cumbersome, but given the absence of any acceptable bright line
indicators it appears to be the only viable option. A further difficulty
might arise if, as in E.G., the minor in question is too ill to attend a
court proceeding. In such circumstances a general modification is in
order: why not employ real time video conferencing technology that
would allow the judge to engage the patient in an in-depth
conversation to determine if the requisite degree of decisional
capacity obtains? Otherwise, the potential right to refuse, its present
weakness notwithstanding, inevitably risks being held hostage to
contingent medical circumstance.
The thorniest procedural issue, however, remains: what about a
conflict between an apparently competent terminally ill adolescent
and his or her parents concerning non-therapeutic treatment
continuation? Undoubtedly, such a situation is tragic for all parties
involved, and it is especially difficult for the attending physician.
Following Hartman, legislative action that carves out a precisely
specified, independent realm of adolescent decision-making strictly
limited to Low Therapeutic Benefit scenarios constitutes the best
solution. 60 The current conservative political climate, however, bodes
ill for such a sweeping proposal. Pursuing a piecemeal approach
appears as the only politically palatable option. Even so, an
adolescent liberty interest can be established and protected -
particularly if hospital protocols and physician backing are
forthcoming. Where do physicians stand on this issue? Although data
are scanty, as evidenced in a recent survey conducted by Hartman,
60 My opposition to Hartman would be with the extent of such a realm as
opposed to its existence.
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two-thirds of physicians queried on this matter responded by saying
that, if forced, they would support the terminally ill adolescent against
his or her parents - in court if necessary.6'
Going to court, however, should be an "eleventh-hour" maneuver.
A more incremental approach proves critical. Obviously, the
regulative ideal in such cases is that the parents allow the adolescent
to decide as he or she sees fit, implicitly recognizing, as it were, their
competent minor child's defacto liberty interest. Except in the most
extreme circumstances, this ideal can still be closely approximated,
even if an initial conflict erupts. To defuse a parental-adolescent
clash, a second physician, unconnected with the case, should be called
in to confirm the terminal diagnosis. A psychiatric consult should
also be performed to insure that the teen is neither delusional nor so
depressed as to be incapacitated - again, following the sliding-scale
model the onus must be on the psychiatrist to prove incapacity. At
this juncture, a meeting with the parents, the adolescent, the attending,
the psychiatrist and a social worker should be held to present reports
on both the capacity assessment (presumably positive) and the
diagnostic findings to the parents. An attempt should be made to
convince the reluctant parents, that given the absence of therapeutic
benefit, their child is quite capable of deciding for him- or herself,
whether further interventions are warranted. Efforts to secure the
support of the parents for the adolescent's decision to refuse treatment
are essential.
If the parents continue to insist on treatment then the hospital
ethics committee should be alerted and presumably come out in
support of the patient. At this juncture, a patient advocate should also
be made available to the adolescent and, if all other options fail, a
court order should be sought permitting the patient to exercise his or
her right to refuse further medical treatment. As noted above, if the
patient is too ill to attend court then real time video conferencing
equipment should enable the judge to make a relatively pro forma
competency evaluation - particularly since the requisite degree of
competency involved is minimal at most. Upon the affirmative
findings of the court, the adolescent would be free to exercise his or
her protected liberty interest to refuse non-therapeutic interventions.
A final attempt at reconciliation ought to be undertaken but in the
event of failure the third party interest in forcing continued treatment
is simply too weak to override the adolescent's liberty interest to the
contrary.
61 Hartman (2001), supra note 2, at 110-12.
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